Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

Depending on the data distribution, the mechanisms can also discourage mis-reports that would lead to inaccurate predictions.

A, B to denote allocations that are exclusively integral and R for randomized allocations. On a high level, the PS-Lottery algorithm uses Birkhoff's We begin by proving a lemma that highlights a connection between not obvious manipulability and randomized mechanisms that output ex-ante proportional allocations. Lemma 5. Inequality (1) (the worst-case guarantee) is satisfied for every randomized mechanism Note that multiple randomized allocations may have the same expected fractional allocation. Recall that, Birkhoff's algorithm, given a square bistochastic matrix, decomposes it into a convex combination (or a lottery) over permutation matrices. Using Lemma 5 we can prove the following theorem.

It is well-understood that, in the absence of monetary transfers, fairness, efficiency and truthfulness cannot be reconciled, in a very strong sense.

We present new algorithms for estimating and testing \emph{collision probability}, a fundamental measure of the spread of a discrete distribution that is widely used in many scientific fields. We describe an algorithm that satisfies $(\alpha, \beta)$-local differential privacy and estimates collision probability with error at most $\epsilon$ using $\tilde{O}\left(\frac{\log(1/\beta)}{\alpha^2 \epsilon^2}\right)$ samples for $\alpha \le 1$, which improves over previous work by a factor of $\frac{1}{\alpha^2}$. We also present a sequential testing algorithm for collision probability, which can distinguish between collision probability values that are separated by $\epsilon$ using $\tilde{O}(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2})$ samples, even when $\epsilon$ is unknown. Our algorithms have nearly the optimal sample complexity, and in experiments we show that they require significantly fewer samples than previous methods.

Although the convolutional neural network (CNN) has achieved excellent performance in vision tasks by extracting the intra-sample representation, it will take a higher training expense because of stacking numerous convolutional layers. Recently, as the bilinear models, graph neural networks (GNN) have succeeded in exploring the underlying topological relationship among the graph data with a few graph neural layers. Unfortunately, it cannot be directly utilized on non-graph data due to the lack of graph structure and has high inference latency on large-scale scenarios. Inspired by these complementary strengths and weaknesses, \textit{we discuss a natural question, how to bridge these two heterogeneous networks?} In this paper, we propose a novel CNN2GNN framework to unify CNN and GNN together via distillation. Firstly, to break the limitations of GNN, a differentiable sparse graph learning module is designed as the head of networks to dynamically learn the graph for inductive learning. Then, a response-based distillation is introduced to transfer the knowledge from CNN to GNN and bridge these two heterogeneous networks. Notably, due to extracting the intra-sample representation of a single instance and the topological relationship among the datasets simultaneously, the performance of distilled ``boosted'' two-layer GNN on Mini-ImageNet is much higher than CNN containing dozens of layers such as ResNet152.

We propose a mechanism for purchasing information from a sequence of participants. The participants may simply hold data points they wish to sell, or may have more sophisticated information; either way, they are incentivized to participate as long as they believe their data points are representative or their information will improve the mechanism's future prediction on a test set. The mechanism, which draws on the principles of prediction markets, has a bounded budget and minimizes generalization error for Bregman divergence loss functions. We then show how to modify this mechanism to preserve the privacy of participants' information: At any given time, the current prices and predictions of the mechanism reveal almost no information about any one participant, yet in total over all participants, information is accurately aggregated.

Fair allocation of indivisible goods has attracted extensive attention over the last two decades, yielding numerous elegant algorithmic results and producing challenging open questions. The problem becomes much harder in the presence of strategic agents. Ideally, one would want to design truthful mechanisms that produce allocations with fairness guarantees. However, in the standard setting without monetary transfers, it is generally impossible to have truthful mechanisms that provide non-trivial fairness guarantees. Recently, Amanatidis et al. [2021] suggested the study of mechanisms that produce fair allocations in their equilibria. Specifically, when the agents have additive valuation functions, the simple Round-Robin algorithm always has pure Nash equilibria and the corresponding allocations are envy-free up to one good (EF1) with respect to the agents' true valuation functions. Following this agenda, we show that this outstanding property of the Round-Robin mechanism extends much beyond the above default assumption of additivity. In particular, we prove that for agents with cancelable valuation functions (a natural class that contains, e.g., additive and budget-additive functions), this simple mechanism always has equilibria and even its approximate equilibria correspond to approximately EF1 allocations with respect to the agents' true valuation functions. Further, we show that the approximate EF1 fairness of approximate equilibria surprisingly holds for the important class of submodular valuation functions as well, even though exact equilibria fail to exist!

In this paper we study estimating Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) in the case where the agents (individuals) are strategic or self-interested and they concern about their privacy when reporting data. Compared with the classical setting, here we aim to design mechanisms that can both incentivize most agents to truthfully report their data and preserve the privacy of individuals' reports, while their outputs should also close to the underlying parameter. In the first part of the paper, we consider the case where the covariates are sub-Gaussian and the responses are heavy-tailed where they only have the finite fourth moments. First, motivated by the stationary condition of the maximizer of the likelihood function, we derive a novel private and closed form estimator. Based on the estimator, we propose a mechanism which has the following properties via some appropriate design of the computation and payment scheme for several canonical models such as linear regression, logistic regression and Poisson regression: (1) the mechanism is $o(1)$-jointly differentially private (with probability at least $1-o(1)$); (2) it is an $o(\frac{1}{n})$-approximate Bayes Nash equilibrium for a $(1-o(1))$-fraction of agents to truthfully report their data, where $n$ is the number of agents; (3) the output could achieve an error of $o(1)$ to the underlying parameter; (4) it is individually rational for a $(1-o(1))$ fraction of agents in the mechanism ; (5) the payment budget required from the analyst to run the mechanism is $o(1)$. In the second part, we consider the linear regression model under more general setting where both covariates and responses are heavy-tailed and only have finite fourth moments. By using an $\ell_4$-norm shrinkage operator, we propose a private estimator and payment scheme which have similar properties as in the sub-Gaussian case.